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DEFAMATION: A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY
Jackie Collins Lerman was surprised to find, in an advance copy of
Adelina magazine, that she was misidentified as an actress who had ap-
peared in a filmed orgy scene. On March 24, 1980, Ms. Lerman filed a
libel action in the Southern District of New York. In Lerman v.
Chuckleberry Publishing Inc.,' ("Lerman I") the district court held in
favor of Ms. Lerman for invasion of privacy and for violation of her right
to publicity.2 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that Ms. Lerman was a public figure for the limited purpose of pornogra-
phy, and thus had to prove actual malice on the part of the defendants in
order to recover.3 Ms. Lerman could not accomplish this difficult task
and, consequently, did not recover.4
The appellate court's statement of the limited purpose public figure
test in this case was consistent with current case law.' However, the
court incorrectly applied the limited purpose public figure label to an
individual who should not have been held to have foregone her right to
privacy concerning the subject matter of Adelina.
Since the landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 it
has become difficult for a public figure or public official to win on a cause
of action for defamation.7 The Supreme Court has reasoned that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited and may include attacks on public
officials.8 Thus, a public official cannot recover damages for defamation
relating to official conduct unless the statement was made with actual
malice.9 The Court has extended this protection of defamatory false-
hoods to include statements about private individuals if the statements
concern a matter of public interest.'° The Court has recognized that the
public interest in encouraging comment upon matters of public concern
1. 544 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. Id. at 973.
3. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 137 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Lerman H").
4. Id. at 141-42.
5. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 364 (1974). There is a constitutional privi-
lege protecting defamatory criticism of even non-public officials who are nevertheless inti-
mately involved in the resolution of an important public question, or, by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id.
8. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 364. See also James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834
(1976).
9. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
10. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-48.
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overrides the privacy interest of individuals in the public spotlight. Thus,
in adopting the rule that public figures must prove actual malice in order
to recover on a cause of action for defamation, the Court has tried to
limit the danger that would-be critics of public figures may be self-cen-
sored because the truthfulness of many factual assertions is difficult to
prove."
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
At the time of this action, Ms. Lerman was the author of nine
novels. She achieved great success in writing about the controversial
topic of the unequal treatment of females in magazines, books and films.
Her books contained many references to sex and included topics on devi-
ate sexual practices. She frequently discussed sexual inequality, con-
cerned that in magazines and films women appear nude much more than
men. She had stated that this was unfair and that there should be equal
nudity for men and women.' 2
Ms. Lerman was the author of a book titled "The World is Full of
Married Men."' 3 This book became a film of the same title and Ms.
Lerman wrote the screenplay, but did not appear in the film.' 4 Subse-
quently, Ms. Lerman was given an advance copy of the May, 1980 issue
of Adelina magazine in which she was misidentified as an actress who
had appeared nude in the film."' The actress in the magazine appeared
topless and in an orgy scene. Both scenes were taken directly from the
film. A caption under the pictures identified Ms. Lerman as the starlet
and the accompanying article discussed the willingness of serious ac-
tresses to appear nude in films.' 6
Ms. Lerman commenced her cause of action for libel, violation of
her common law right to publicity and violation of New York's statutory
protection of one's own name or portrait for advertising and trade pur-
poses. '7 She sued the publisher of the magazine, Chuckleberry Publish-
11. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
12. Lerman 11, 745 F.2d at 137. Ms. Lerman is the author of the following novels: Lucky,
Hollywood Wives, The Bitch, Sinners, Chances, The Stud, The Love Killers, The World is Full
of Divorced Women, Lovers, Gamblers and Hollywood Husbands.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 127. The court stated that Ms. Lerman had never appeared nude in public.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51(a), (McKinney 976). "Any person whose name, portrait
or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained ... may maintain an action in the Supreme Court of this
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ing, Inc. ("Chuckleberry") and the original national distributor,
Publisher's Distributing Co. ("PDC")."8
The trial judge in the Southern District of New York issued a pre-
liminary injunction, restraining the distribution of the May issue of Ade-
lina. 9 PDC endeavored to comply,2" but after the May issue was in the
process of distribution, Flynt Distributing ("Flynt") purchased PDC's
contract to distribute Adelina.2 ' The judge granted Lerman's motion for
summary judgment against all three defendants for violation of the New
York Civil Rights Law and for invasion of plaintiff's common law right
to publicity, but a jury question remained as to the amount of damages to
be awarded. However, the libel cause of action was dismissed by the trial
court, which held that the New York Civil Rights Law was merely a
statutory embodiment of a common law libel cause of action.22 In Feb-
ruary, 1983, Lerman settled with PDC for $100,000 and Chuckleberry
became insolvent. 23 In the damage trial against the remaining defendant,
Flynt, the jury awarded Ms. Lerman $7 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $33 million in exemplary damages.24 Flynt's appeal followed.
B. The Court's Reasoning
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's
interpretation of the New York Civil Rights Law as a statutory embodi-
ment of a common law libel cause of action.25 The court of appeals inter-
preted the New York statute to consist of two alternative prongs. First, a
defendant violates the advertising purposes prong when the plaintiff's
name is used solely for the purpose of soliciting purchasers for the de-
fendant's product. Second, a defendant violates the trade purposes prong
when the defendant uses the plaintiff's name for the purpose of benefiting
defendant's own trade.26
The appellate court found that the plaintiff could not take advantage
state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture .. " Id.
There was no right to privacy at common law in New York. Such a right existed only statuto-
rily. Cardy v. Maxwell, 169 N.Y.2d 547, 9 Misc. 2d 329 (1957).
18. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
19. Id. at 1107.
20. Lerman II, 745 F.2d at 128. The June, 1980 and January, 1981 issues also contained a
solicitation page which reprinted the May, 1980 cover ofAdelina. Id.
21. Id. Flynt was joined as a party defendant in April, 1981.
22. Lerman I, 544 F. Supp. at 973. Duplication of claims thus mandated dismissal. Id.
23. Lerman II, 745 F.2d at 128. Chuckleberry subsequently filed for bankruptcy.
24. Id. The court reduced the exemplary damages to $3 million, leaving intact an award
of $10 million.
25. Id. at 130.
26. Id. at 130-31.
1987]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
of the advertising purposes prong because the defendant had not used the
plaintiff's name to solicit new subscribers.2 7 With respect to the trade
purposes prong, the court ruled that Ms. Lerman would not normally be
able to state a cause of action because she was held to be a public figure
involved in a newsworthy event. Thus, the use of her name or portrait
would be held to constitute a comment upon a newsworthy event, rather
than a trade purpose.2" However, Ms. Lerman was allowed to state a
cause of action under the trade purposes prong of the statute because she
made a showing that Flynt had forfeited the privilege of reporting news-
worthy events by using false material.29
The Second Circuit looked to the United States Constitution in or-
der to define the degree of fault Ms. Lerman should have been required
to prove under the trade purposes prong of the statute.3" First, the court
stated that Ms. Lerman was a limited purpose public figure. The court
enunciated the following test to determine what constitutes a limited pur-
pose public figure:
A defendant must show that the plaintiff has:
(1) Successfully invited attention to her views in an effort to
influence others;
(2) Voluntarily injected herself into a public controversy re-
lated to the litigation;
(3) Assumed a prominent position in the controversy; and
(4) Maintained regular and continuing access to the media.3
The court found that Ms. Lerman was a limited purpose public fig-
ure because she voluntarily chose to focus public attention on her views
concerning sexual morality. She had been successful in achieving notori-
ety in the controversy concerning the inequality of female nudity in
magazines and films.32 Thus, Ms. Lerman was a public figure for the
limited purpose of this controversy.33
Once labelled as a public figure, Ms. Lerman could recover compen-
satory damages only if Flynt acted with actual malice in publishing the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 131.
29. Id. at 132. While Flynt claimed that the statute was not applicable to him, the court
reasoned that Flynt had "used" Ms. Lerman's name by purchasing the distributing contract
entitling them to profits.
30. Id. at 135. Specifically, the court focused on the first amendment and the standard of
proof required of a limited purpose public figure plaintiff in a libel cause of action. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 136-37. In summary, the court stated that the essential element of a public
figure is that the publicized person has taken affirmative steps to attract public attention. Id.




falsehood.34 This requirement proved to be fatal to Ms. Lerman's claim
because she could not prove that Flynt possessed a high degree of aware-
ness of the probable falsity of the article.35
II. ANALYSIS
The importance of the Lerman decision lies in the appellate court's
application of the limited purpose public figure test to Ms. Lerman. The
topic of libel and public figures has attracted much attention since the
landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.36 There, the
Supreme Court stated that a public official cannot recover compensatory
damages for defamation related to official conduct unless the plaintiff
proved that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
conduct that was highly unreasonable and an extreme departure from
normal standards. The Court reasoned that punishing publication of an
erroneous statement concerning a public official may induce over-cau-
tious exercise of freedom of the press.37 A few years later, in Curtiss
Publishing Co. v. Butts,38 the same standard of proof was logically ex-
tended to apply to public figures.
To decide whether the plaintiff is a public figure, the court must
look at the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the par-
ticular controversy giving rise to the defamation.39 By voluntarily partic-
ipating in a public controversy, an individual has purposefully
surrendered part of what would otherwise have been a protectable pri-
vacy right."
The appellate court in Lerman drew upon a long line of first amend-
ment case law in stating that a limited purpose public figure also must
prove that a defendant has acted with actual malice in publishing a false-
hood concerning the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy into
34. Id. at 139. The court recognized that the first amendment guarantees a certain amount
of protection to publishers who are commenting on newsworthy events. The court stated that
the imposition of liability without proof of a high degree of fault would amount to an unac-
ceptable chill upon publishers' first amendment rights.
35. Id. at 141. Although the district court failed to instruct the jury that, in order to find
Flynt liable, it must find that Flynt acted with actual malice, the court held as a matter of law
that a properly instructed jury could not have found that Flynt acted with actual malice. Id.
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 279-80.
38. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Curtiss, the court held that a college athletic director, accused
in a published article of conspiring to "fix" a football game, had not surrendered any of his
protectable privacy rights because he was not a public figure. The article was based on a
telephone conversation in which he had been accidentally overheard. Id.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
40. James, 40 N.Y.2d at 423, 353 N.E.2d at 840.
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which the plaintiff has voluntarily injected herself.4 Thus, the Lerman
decision seems consistent with current thought concerning the competing
interests of the first amendment and an individual's right to privacy.
When the limited purpose public figure test is applied to Ms.
Lerman, it is certainly clear that she has successfully invited public atten-
tion to her views concerning a particular controversy. She has achieved
celebrity status as an author and maintains continuous access to the me-
dia. Therefore, with respect to the particular controversy in which she
was involved, Ms. Lerman had purposefully surrendered what would
otherwise have been her protectible privacy rights. However, the exact
manner in which the particular controversy is defined becomes crucial
because both the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct must involve the
same controversy before the plaintiff will be required to prove malice on
the part of a defendant publishing false material.42
In Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc. ," the court recognized
the need to define the precise controversy involved, analyze the plaintiff's
role in the controversy and determine if the defamatory material was
germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy.' However, in
Lerman, the appellate court loosely defined the controversy when it
stated that Ms. Lerman was a public figure for the purpose of comment-
ing on sex and nudity in magazines and films.45 Adelina also may have
been commenting on sex and nudity in films when it published a mis-
labelled nude photograph with an article discussing the willingness of
serious actresses to appear nude in films. However, the problem in the
appellate court's reasoning lies in the fact that the controversy was too
broadly defined as sex and nudity in films. Rather, it seems that Ms.
Lerman was involved in a controversy relating to the unequal treatment
of men and women in the media.4 6
It was correct that Ms. Lerman sometimes wrote about sexual be-
havior, but it was only in the context of her primary topic concerning the
unequal treatment of men and women and a double standard in sexual
mores.47 The appellate court was mistaken in ruling that Ms. Lerman
41. Lerman 11, 745 F.2d at 139 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 254; Geiger v. Dell
Publ. Co., 719 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1983); Bargar v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151
(D.C. Cal. 1983)).
42. Lerman 11, 745 F.2d at 137.
43. 619 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1985).
44. Id. at 702; Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ., Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C.Cir.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 898 (1980).
45. 745 F.2d at 137.





had surrendered her privacy rights concerning any other controversy. If
the controversy had been more narrowly defined, it would have been
clear that Adelina was not commenting upon the double standard ex-
isting with respect to women. Rather, Adelina had merely mislabelled
nude photographs with an accompanying article.
Further, as a participant in a public controversy, Ms. Lerman also
had a right to exercise her own freedom of speech. It is possible that, as a
result of the appellate court's decision, Ms. Lerman will curtail her com-
ments on this particular controversy in fear that she will thereby expose
herself to comment in less than reputable periodicals.48 There is a con-
spicuous lack of recognition by the appellate court of Ms. Lerman's first
amendment rights. Ms. Lerman achieved her status as a limited purpose
public figure due to her reputation as a widely published author. Thus,
Ms. Lerman is to be distinguished from other limited purpose public
figures who do not publish novels which reach a wide audience. There-
fore, there is a greater danger in Ms. Lerman's situation in that her pub-
lic comments upon a newsworthy event will be denied from members of
the public who are interested in the controversy.
In basing the decision upon a loosely defined controversy, it is possi-
ble that the appellate court was influenced by Ms. Lerman's viewpoint on
the unequal treatment of the sexes. As a participant in that controversy,
Ms. Lerman had, on occasion, advocated equal nudity for men and wo-
men in pornographic magazines in order to make a point concerning
double standards. The appellate court believed that the controversy in
which Ms. Lerman is involved should be defined to include material pub-
lished in magazines such as Adelina. In doing so, the court may have
been biased against Ms. Lerman's unusual viewpoint.
III. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that Ms. Lerman attempted to comment upon a genu-
ine social problem, although in a somewhat unorthodox fashion. Yet,
the appellate court's decision implies that, in terms of first amendment
policies, the comments in the May, 1980 issue of Adelina are more im-
portant than Ms. Lerman's privacy rights. Also implicit in the court's
decision is the fact that Ms. Lerman's comments concerning this particu-
lar controversy may be chilled. One questions whether this is the kind of
public debate envisioned by the New York Times decision, where the
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the actual malice standard is to
48. Ms. Lerman's most recent novel is titled Hollywood Husbands, Simon and Schuster,
1986. The primary topic of this novel does not concern the present controversy.
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encourage public debate.49 It is difficult to classify a mislabelled nude
picture as part of a public debate on a public controversy which is to be
encouraged by the denial of an individual's right to privacy. Yet, this is
precisely what the appellate court was doing when it ruled that the May,
1980 issue of Adelina magazine should take precedence over Ms.
Lerman's rights to privacy and free speech.
The appellate court's decision does not seem to be entirely sup-
ported by logic or precedent. It is possible that the court's bias against
Ms. Lerman's views lead it to broadly define the relevant controversy.
The court should have taken a narrower view of the controversy. The
manner in which the controversy is defined is of primary importance, due
to the strong standard of proof required of a limited purpose public figure
who attempts to enforce her right to privacy against a publisher."0 The
controversy Ms. Lerman was participating in should have been defined as
the unequal treatment of female nudity in the media.5" A newspaper
may comment on Ms. Lerman's involvement in this issue and commit
factual errors as long as it is not done with malice.52 Ms. Lerman would
then have given up her right to privacy concerning her views on this
subject. But, in doing so, she did not also give up her right not to be
identified as an actress appearing nude.
Vito A. Costanzo
49. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
50. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l. Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982). In Pring, a partici-
pant in the Miss America beauty pageant brought a defamation action against PENTHOUSE for
publishing a completely false article concerning plaintiff's participation in the pageant. The
court held that the action must be dismissed because the publication was pure fantasy and it
was unlikely that anyone would believe it. Id. at 443.
51. 745 F.2d at 137. The court stated that Ms. Lerman's novels were controversial in
nature because of her firm conviction that there was inequality in the treatment of females as
compared to males. The court stated that this was the focal point of her comments to the
press. The court also stated that the short article in the May, 1980 issue of ADELINA discussed
the increased willingness of serious actresses to appear nude in films. Id. at 127. The court
then implied that Ms. Lerman's topic of sexual inequality was part of the controversy concern-
ing serious actresses who appear nude in films. Id. at 137.
52. For example, a newspaper may erroneously report Ms. Lerman's views with respect to
this issue.
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